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INTRODUCTION.
While the leaning of the Federal Courts, has for a
long time been inclined to the doc-rine as laid down in
Swift v. Tyson, there is a geat diversity of opinion among
the several States, and as equally eminent jurists have ex-
pressed their conviutions o:n one or the.cther side of the
question, and os, the number of States holding the doctrine
of One class are about the same as the number holding the
other way, we see that the question is nowiso settled.
I shall endeavor to draw from a review of these decision
that which seems to the writer the better doctrine to follow
at the present time.
T17 RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF A BONA FIDE HOLDER OF A INEGO-
TTABLE INSTRUMNT TAMI AS COLLATERAL SECURITY FOR A PRE-EX-
ISTING DEBT.
The first great ca.se under which the above question
arose is, the case o- Bay v. Coddington, 5 Johns, Ch., 54,.
The question arose before Chancellor Kent, wvho held that
one who received negotiable paper in the usual course of
trade, for a fair and valuable consideration, was a holder
for value, but that where such paper was deposited as col-
latteral security against certain antecedent liabilities,
the holder took the paper subject to the equities existing
between the parties, (antecedent ), to the note .
Upon the appeal taken, the court substantiated the
law and doctrine as laid down in the former trial; and in
an elaborate opinion of Woodwarth J. which -he quote, the
court laid down the principle more stongly. 11 The right to
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hold against the owner in any case is an exception to the
general rule of law: it is founded on principles of commer-
cial law. The reason of such a rule would seem to be that
the innocent holder, having incurred loss by giving credit to
the paper, and having paid a fair equivalent, is entitled
to protection. But what superior equity has the holder who
made no advances, nor incurred any responsibility on the
credit of the papEr he received , whose situation will be
improved, if he is allowed to retain , but , if not is in
the condition he was before the paper was passed ? To
allow such a state of facts as sufficient to resist the title
of the real owner would be productive of manifest injustice
and it is enough if the holder be secure when he advaices his
funds, or makes himself liable on the credit of the paper
he receives. In coincidence with this principle, it appears
to me, all cases have been decided."
It might be well to state here the facts of this
case, and do it as briefly as possible. One Bay, had a ves-
sel to sell, he employed as agents Randolph and Savage to
sell the same, which they did, selling her on credit,. They
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were authorized to sell her on credit if necessary, and
transmit the notes to Bay.. They took notes payable at the
end of one, two, three, and four months,. Some made payable
to, and endorsed by P.Aymar & Co., and others by Q.R.Stewart.
On the 12th. of June, 1819, R.and S. delivered the notes so
indorsed to the defendants, J.& C.Coddington, who, were, at
that time, as they stated in their answer under heavy respon-
sibilities for R. & S. as indorsers of notes for their accom-
pdation payable at different times, but all subsequent to the
12th. of June, 1819, and which they were afterwards obliged
to take up as they fell due, amounting to above $17.000.
The answer admitted that R.& S. had stopped payment,
when the notes so held by them were to be delivered to J. &
C. Coddington. Defendants denied all knowledge of the manncr
in which the notes had come into th(. hands of R.& S. and al-
leged that they believed they were bona fide and exclusive
property of R.& S.; that they received these notes with
others as a guaranty and indemnity , as far as they would
avail, for their responsibilities, and three days after dis-
posed of some of the notes for cash,. They admitted that
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when they received the bills, R.& S. were not in a strict
legal sense indebted to them. But they were under large
gratuitous responsibilities to them.
Chancellor Kent, stated the opinion of the court as fol-
lows: " It is admitted that R.& S. held the notes belonging
to the plaintiff, and which they transferred tc the defend-
ants . J.& C.Coddington, on the 12th. of June, 1819, as
agents or trustees of the plaintiff , and that they had no
authority to pass them aw a y. It was a gross and fraudulent
abuse of trust on the part of R.& S.,. The only question
now is whether J. & C.C., are entitled to hold the notes, and
retain the amount of them as against the plaintiff.
Negotiable paper can be assigned or transferred by an
agent or factor or by any other person fraudulently, so as to
bind the true owner as against the holder, provided it be
taken in the usual course of trade, and for a fair and valua-
ble consideration, without notice f fraud. But J.& C.C.,
do not come under that class. The notes were not sc nego-
tiated, nor for the payment of a pre-existing debt, nor for
cash, or property advanced. They were received after R.& S.
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had become insolvent. They are not holders for a valuable
consideration within the meaning or policy of the law."
The next c,s(3 that arose in U.Y., upon this point was
that of Stalker v. McDonald, 0 Hill, 93, where the court laid
down the followinF, though not in the language of the court
shows the intent of the court at that date. The lower court
had followed the doctrine of Bay v. Coddington, and an appeal
being taken, solely for the purpose of having the court
follow the decision of Swift v. Tyson, ( which case had just
been decided) . The court holding that in questions of
local law, it was the duty of the courts to follow the pre-
cednts of state decisions,not those of Federal Courts.
And in an elaborate review of the cases before decieded upon
this question, the court with some little hesitancy , decided
to follow the doctrine as laid down in Coddington v. Bay.
The court holding as follows: Paper taken as collateral
security for an antecedent debt ----- " One who takes a note
merely as collateral security for an antecedent debt, with-
out advancing anything upon it or relinquishing any security,
is not a holder in the due course of trade."
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The cases which haVe arisen in New YorV since the two
cases of Bay v. Coddington, and Stalker v. McDonald, have
been merely a repetition of those decisions, and the courts
seem to be bound to follow the rulings of those cases whether
the facts are similar or not ..
But in the case of Brown v. Leavitt, 3l N.Y., 1.3, the
court held, that where a note is taken in payment of an
over-due note, the person becomes a holder for value. And
the court refused to open discussion on the question ,saying,
" A further discussion uf the question might lead to a sus-
picion that thVc law w7as not settled and in doubt upon this
point.
But there is a clear distinction between this case and
the case of Bay v. Coddington,. In that case the notes were
taken as security of and for notes that were not yet due, and
from persons who had not the authority to so transfer them.
but in the present case, the notes were taken for debts that
were already and ocer-due. Thus this case does not over-
rule the case at bar.
T>, next case at bar, was that of Bank of the State of
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New York v. Vanderhorst, 32 N.Y., 522. The decision of this
case was adverse to the decision of Bay v. Coddington, but
the reasons were plainly clear, in the present case the notes
were taken by a bona fide holder for value without notice of
any equities , and in the usual course of trade and business,
but in the previous case of Bay v. Coddington, the notes were
not taken free from from any equities, as the court almost
as much as said that there were elements of fraud and collus-
ion existing, and that they were not taken in the usual
course of trade and business.
And what constitutes a bona fide holder scems to bear
greatly upon the reasons for the difference of these two de-
cisions. Whether a person who receives a promissory note ,
which has been diverted from the purpose for which it was
made, be a bona fide holder, depends upon the fact of his
having parted with value, at the time. if he merely take it
as collateral security for a pre-existing debt, he is not a
holder for value, and is not ebtitled to recover as a bona
fide holder for value.
The next case in New York, was that of Broohman v Metcalf
m0w
32 N.Y., 534, where the court substantaited the doctrine of
Bank v. Vanderhorst, holding, that where an insurance com-
pany takes notes as payment-. for advance premiums and hold not
the same as security merelythey are bona fide holders for
value and are entitled to such protection. And have the
right to transfer the same in payment of a debt, and the
party taken the same is a bona fide holder without equities.
The reasons for the court diverting from the decision
of Bay v. Coddington, are the same as laid down in the case
before.
In the case of Pratt v. Coman, 37 N.Y., 513, a case
which is sometimes cited as overruliL the case of Bay v.
Coddington, is in fact a case that has nothing similar what-
ever to the case just mentioned. Here the holder of a note
transfers his own note, which note of his givenis over due,
and receives in exchange a note of a third person, before its
maturity, is held to be a bona fide holder for value .
But now if it had distinctly appeared in the above case
that the note was to be held sirply as a security for the
debt dte to the plaintiff for the money loaned, the plaIntiff
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having the right and privilege to sue for the debt at any
moment he saw fit , than I think this Case would fallunder
the head of Bay v. Coddington, and with the present ruling
would then overrule that decision, but as it stands I think
it has ho bearing upon the case whatever.
Before tracing further the cases laid down in New York,
which are in opposition, let us look at the decisions of
other States that have followed the doctrine of this famous
case.
By a careful review cf the decisions of the different
states, I have found that the following States have supported
the doctrine of the early New York courts, viz:- Maine,
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Arkansas, Wisconsin, Ohio, Ken-
tucky, Tennessee, Iowa, Alabama, North Carolina, and Virginia.
Although there have been rulings in several of these
States to the contra, yet I feel safe in saying the. these
States stand by the doctrine of the New York court in the
case of Bay v. Coddington.
These States substantially holding the following: that a
bona fide holder of a note taken as collataral security for
-10-
antecedent or pro-existing liability, is considered to take
it subject to the equities existing between the prior parties
to the bill.
In Maine, the question arose in the ce of Bramegall V.
Beckett, 31 Me., 205. The court in the opinion said that
the case had never been passed upon before in that State;
but they held ," on general principles as well as upon au-
thority, that the indorsee of an accommodation bill or note,
wgo has given no consideration for it, and who does not claim
through a party for value, is not entitled to protection
against the eqtities of the accormmodation maker. If he re-
ceived a bill or note as collateral security merely, for a
pre-existing debt without notice, partiug with no right what-
ever, or extending any forbearance, or giving any other con-
sideration, the transmction will not constitute a cormercial
negotiation in the usual course of business and trade, and
he cannot be regarded as a holder for a valuable considera-
tion."
Thts decision seems to me to be in line with that of
Bay v. Coddington, and the reasons for the court so deciding
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is one of no question for dispute whatever, for the facts are
such as seems to me to be the only just decicion that could
be reached under such reasoning .
In the case of Petrie v. Clark, 11 S.& R., 377 (Pa.),
The court followed the above rule in quite an able decision.
The facts were as follows: Here A. being indebted to B.
on his own note, after it became due arranged with B. to
have it taken up by him, and to have a new note of five months
substituted for it, and gave ". another note of one C's. to
be kept by him as collateral security for the debt. Judge
Gibson who rendered the decision of the court , laid down in
substance the following: That there is a great difference
between the pawning of a security for a past debt , than of
the pawning for a present debt, or for money advanced at the
time. As to the first , all the cases agree, that the
interest of the pawnee is defeasible by creditors or legatees.
As to the latter is where the dividing line presents
it self, but the court adopted the rule of New York, although
not doing so in express terms.
In Royer v. Bank, 4 W.N.C., 1a, (Pa.) . The court reiter-
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ated the same doctrine, and went still further, in holding
that a valuable consideration was not to'be implied from the
mere renewal of a negotiable paper, and the same defehce cam
be made to the note given in renewal as to the original note.
In Lee v. Smead , 1 Met., 628, (Ky.) The question arose
and the court followed the N.Y. rule. Duval. J., cited at
length from the opinion of Woodwarth. J., and in his opinion
decided thz the question was a local one, and should be
governed by State decisions, and not b,, U.S. courts.
In Reddick v. Jones, 6 Ired., 107, (N.C.)., the court in
delivering the opinion, was somewhat doubtful as to which was
the better law, but intimated that the holder of a note as
collator, was not a bona fide holder for value.
Tennessee, also in several early decisions was somewhat
in doubt as to which of the line was the better to follow,
btt in the case of King v. Doolittle, 10 Yerg., 77, came out
square and declared that the law was settled in Tennessee,
and the same was in accordance with the principles of the
New York decision of Bay v. Coddington.
In Iowa the courts decided to follow the doctrine as
-13-
laid down in the Ohio courts.
Tle law in Ohio upon this question has been at variance:
in an early decision, they attempted to follow the doctrine
as laid down in the U.S. courts,ll Ohio, 172, but in a case
in 6 Ohio St., 448, Roxborough v. Mresick, they returned to
the doctrine of the New York courts. In this latter case
the court laid down the principle as follows: " When a no-e
of a third person is transferred bona fide before due-, as a c
collateral security and for value, such as a loan or further
advancement, or stipulation, express or implied, of further
time to pay a pre-existing debt, or a fu-ther credit, or a
change of security of a pre-existing debt, or the like, the
assignee of such collateral will be protected from infirmi-
ties affecting the instrument before it was thus transferred.
If however, a note is transferred as collateral security to a
pre-existing debt, without any consideration, so that the
transfer is a mer( voluntary act on the part of the debtor,
and is received by the creditor without incurring aiy new re-
sponsibility, parting with any right, or subjecting himself
to any loss or delay, and leaving the subsisting debt precise-
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ly in the condition it was before such collateral was taken
the holder has not taken the note for value, nr in the usual
course of trade; and to hold otherwise, would be a departure
from the established rules of law governing the rights of
parties to negotiable paper, and losing sight of the grounds
of public policy upon whic the law is founded."
Here in this case adebt was contracted, nothing was
entered into for any further security of the debt, and the
debtor afterward, without necessity for doing so, or any ob-
ligation for the same , transfers a negotiable instrument,
to secure a pre-existing debt, the parties being in the same
relation there is no new consideration between the parties,
and as the note in the present case was not taken inthe usual
course of trade, I yhink the court was right in holding that
he was bcund to tkae it subject to all equities existing
b,tween the antecedent parties, at the time the transfer was
made.
In the case of Carlisle v. Wishart, 11 Ohio, 172, Judge
Wood, stated the quest ion as to what the court was to base
their decision on was as follows:- " This motion, it will be
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seen therefore presciats the question fo: t h consideration of
the court, whether the transfer for . negotiable note, be-
fore due, and without notice, and the consideration of the
transfer of a precedent debt, subjects the indorsee to all
the equities existing between the original parties."
This case was decided in the lower court mereily on the
grounds of it having been transferred for a pre-existing debt
the court seeming to think that of itself was enough' to de-
feat the plaintiff's action to recover. But in th higher
court it was rov(rsed solely on the ,-eight of the dicta
in the case of Swift v. Tyson.
I could cite cases indofinitely almost upon this side of
the question but I have another line of cases to consider,
those followin. the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, the substance
of which doctrine can be briefly stated as follows : A per-
son who is the bona fide holder of a bill of exchange or a
note, and who takes before maturity, in paymwnt of a pre-ex-
isting debt without notice of a-y equities existing between
the drawer and acceptor, is unaffected by those equities.
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The first case that natuvally follows for us to consid.r
is the case wvhich is the root of all the decisions vihich have
since arisen:- The case of Srift v. Tyson, 10 Peters, 1.
The facts of this case are substantially as follows.
An action was brought by the plaitrtiff S. as indorsee,
against the defcndant, T. as acceptor upon a bill of exchange
made at Portland, Iraine, May 1, 186, for the sum of $1540.30
payable six moths after date and gracem drawn by one Norton,
and one Keith, at the city of New York, in favor of the order
of Norton, and by Norton indorsed to the plaintiff . The
bill was dishonored at maturity, at the trial the acceptance
and indorsement of the bill were admitted, and the plaintiff
there rested his case. The dceendant then introduced evi-
dence -.hich was Swift's answer to a bill of discovery, by
which it appeared that Swift took the bill before it became
due, in .ayment of a promissory note duo to him by Norton and
Keith; that he understood that the bill Vras accepteC in part
payment of some lands sold by Norton to a company in New York.
Judge Story in delivering the opinion of the court said:-
We have no hesitancy in saying that a pre-existing debt
-17-
does constitute, , valuable consideration in the sense of
the general rule already stated, as applicablo to negotiable
instrurmlents. Assuming it to be true ( which, however,
may well admit of some doubt from the generality of the lan-
guage) that the holder of a negotiable instrument is unaf-
fected with the equities between the antecedent parties, of
which he has i-o notice, only where he receives it in the
usual course of trade and business for a valuable considerc-
tion, before it becomes due, we are peepared to say, that
receiving it in -)ayment of or as security for a pro-existing
debt is according to the known and usual coursu of trade and
business. And, why, upon principle, should not a pre-exist-
ing debt be deemed such a valuable consideration? It is for
the benefit and convenience of the commercial world to giue
as wide an extent as practicable to the credit and circula-
tion of negotiable paper, that it may pass not only as se-
curity for new purchases and advances made ucn t t,-:sofer
thereof, but also in payment of an. as security for pre-
existing debts. The creditor is there y enabled to realize
or secure his debt, and thus may safely give a prolonged
-18-
credit, or forbear from taking any legJl steps to enforce
his rights. Thle debtor also has the advantage of making his
negotiable security of equivalent value to cash. "
I shall next endeavor to cite a few cases scattered
throughout the different states of the union which ffollow
the doctrine as just enunciated.
We find that the number of states that follocv the doct-
rine of Swift v Tyson, are just as numerous if not more so
than those which follow the doctrine as laid down in Bay v.
Coddingt on.
The followring states have supproted the doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson,: :.*Iasachucetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut,
Veripont, Now Jersey, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, California,
Texas, Georgia, Irississippi, South Carolina, and also England
has su-orted this lateer decision as the better law.
Ir the case of Blancahrd v. Stevens, 3 Cush., 162, the
question did not squarely arise before the court, but in the
course of the opinion delivered by Judge Dewey, he in his
dicta, laid down that which would be the law assuming the
facts of the Svrift v. Tyson case, assuming that a note was
-19-
taken as collateral security, instead as y hnt of a debt,
the equities of the former party would be excluded . He
held that if the parties had not received the notes as collat-
eral security, they might have have pursued other rem dies
tc enforce the security of the payment of the debt. " It is
fallacy to say that if the plaintiffs are defeated in their
attempts to enforce the payment of these notes by allowing
this defence to )revail, yet nevertheless they are in as good
a situation, as they would have been i- if the notes ha. not
been transferred to them. The convenience and safety of
those dealings in negotiable paper seem to rejuire and justify
the rule."
Nearly all the -ecisions that have teen decided upon
this point in the line of and with the doctrine of ,wift.v.
Tyson, have based their grounds of decision upon the question
as to whether the notes were taken in the usual course of tra
trade and business, and if so taken they were not subject to
the equities of the antecedent parties thqy being bona fide
holfers, and therefore wexe not subject to the equities
Such was the reasoning of the Rhode Island courts in
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the two cases of Bank v. Carrington ot al., 5 R.I., 515; and
Cobb v. Doyle, 7 R.I., 550.,. In the former the court held
that the papors wore taken in the usual course and business
of trade , and as commercial papers should be given all the
credit and currency Dossibl, therefore it should be the
duty of the court to encourage not discourage the transfer
of negotiable instruments. And in the latter case the court
reasoned in the cal-.e line holding tha t it was the duty of
courts to look after the interests of commercial paper with
as much wisdom as possible.
Again many of thl courts, have gone a step further in
advance, and opened up a wider field for the circulation of
negotiable instr:':,ets, by holding that there was no differ-
ence between th' giving of a note as payment of a debt, of
the giving of the same as a security for an antecednt debt.
Both constituting the holder a holder for value. Osgood v.
Bank, 30 Cornn., 217; Roberts v. Hall., 213; Bridgeport v.
Welch, 29 Conn., 475;
A question which was raised in the case of 0- ,ift v.
Tyson, Was, awWr the question as to the negotiability of
-21-
papers, whether the same came under the he'd of negotiable
papers, or under the Federal courts , and were to be governed
by the same. But the court in this case hold that the section
of the Ju-i iary act referred to, governed the title of real
property not questio-Is of general commercial law such as
bills of exchange or promissory notes. And they held that
the stress placed upon the word "laws" in the statute referred
to merely loca: l laws generally and not to laws and questions
affecting the general commercial world.
In the case of Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Church, 81 NY., 218,
( which is about the latest case of any importance that has
been d'ecided in New York) The court followed the doctrine
of Bay v. Coddington , on the very same grounds .s in that
case. In this case a note was transferred in fraud of one
of the antecedent parties, and the court without any hesitancy
laid down the rule as follows:- ' Priov equities of anteced-
ent parties to negotiable paper transferm d in fraud of their
rights will prevail against an indc -see who has receive d it
merely in nominal payment of a precedent debt.1"
-22-
Thus we now re'ach a point in our discussion where it
becomes necessary for us to define :
First. What constitutecs a person a holder for value
It will be perceived thtt the ground upon which the
holder of a negotiable pa-por, taken in payment of a precedent
debt, i held to be a holder for value, is, thet he receives
the paper as a payment of the original debt, whereby the
original debt is at least for the tine being, discharged.
The creditor is in effect a purchaser of -"e negotiable
paper; and for it he parts with the original obligation of
the precedent debt, changing thereby his relations to his
debtor and the liability of the debtor to him. And it is
this leading fact in these line of cases that should be
distinguished an- brought to our sight, as in my mind it
this method of regulation of tIe pre-existing indebtedness
that makes tIL creditor a holier for value.
Second . What constitutes " in the usual course of trade and
business" .
In order that a bona fide holder may claim protection
a-ainst defences, not appearing on the face of commercial
-247-
paper, it is said that he must have acquired it in the t
usual course of business". This phrase maens according to
the usages and customs of cor-ercial transactions.
Third. What will constitute a valuable consideration.
Will a pro-existing debt constitute a sufficient consid-
eration ? From the weight of text-writers , it seems to me
that it would be stfficient, as it has been generally held
that an existing debt is sufficient consideration for a note
or other connuercial instrument. This is true, whether the
existing debt is an op.en account or one of some other nature,
there seemsto be sufficient consideration to support them.
Wherein therefore does the distinction between these two
doctrines lie. It seems to mc from the facts of the case of
Bay v. Coddington, that the transection was not made in the
usual couree of trade and business, and it is plainly to be
discerned from the decision of the court that there were
elements of fraud running through the whole transition, thus
not making the party a bona fide holder for value. And I
think the court in this case done that which was just and
equitable in the rendering of their decision. But look at
-24-
facts in the casc of Swift v. Tyson, here everything ws done
in the usual course of business, and there was not the least
clomont of fraud to be seen from the transaction, and I think
the court that rendered the decision in the case of Bay v.
Coddington ,with theee same facts "efore them would have
reached the --ame decision as did the Federal Court.
But the trouble does not stop here. Later courts without
even aeci-hing or looking at the reasoning of the decision in
that ase go on in blind error and follow that decision as
though duty bound to do it, without regard to justice or
equity.
Taking the weight of authority into consideration, and
the reasons on which they rest, I think the courts of the
different states should not hesitate to follow the rule laid
down by the Supreme Court of this Country. In doin this
no one is injured, for it is only enforcing a good rule, that
has, in some instances, been departed from; it is n~t adopt-
ing any rule which is to cha-.ge any rights of property; and
if it has a tendancy to prevent one from parting with his
nane in a negotiable form, it nigt inthat respect operate
beneficially .
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If we follow the rule as laid down in Bay v. Coddington,
where will we come to in regard to negotiable papers. If the
holder of a negotiable bill or note can be met with the same
defense, th-at could be made to the original payee, from whom
he received it, what becomes of all classex of bills and
notes made for th( accomraodation of some of the parties?
None of the original parties to such paper could maintain
any action on it.
We are living in an age of business a.d hustlc
where business requires all the assistance that'it can re-
ceive to keep it on its feet- and the freedom of exchange is
one that is necessary in a busy world ; then why place a
monument upon it , why not increase, then endeavor to decrease
the right of circulation, that what is being done every time
the court follows the decision of Bay v. Co~dington, they are
opening a field of doubt, and if continued it will only be a
question of short time when the privilege of negotiability
will be relcsa.-t6 the past.
-26-
CONCLUSION .
We find therefore, by a careful review of the dif-
ferent cases that have arisen throughout tho State an' UniteC
States Courts, the there is no settled doctrine for future
courts to follow. And as the decision and precedents of the
rulings of the Federal Courts are not bound to be followed,
the State courts are open to any line that they may choose.
But it seems to me that the bettor rule would be , the
one , that puts as little restraint on negotiability as pos-
sible, and allows a wide field of circulation of comrercial
paper.
Fred .B3rown ,el. Davis, '94.
May, 21, 1894.
